Transparency and Communication of Central Banks

Main content

We examine which information should be published by central banks. Specific issues are for example:

  • Should central banks publish their estimates about economic shocks?
  • Should committees, for example monetary policy committees, publish details about decision-making, in particular voting records?
  • Is the publication of policy intentions desirable?
  • Should central bankers be subject to inflation forecast contracts?
  • Should central bankers be subject to forward guidance contracts?

Publications

  • Inflation Forecast Contracts, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 48, 2014, 26-40.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • Effective Forward Guidance: Scrupulous Central Bankers and Forecast Contracts, in: Wouter den Haan (ed.), Forward Guidance, Vox eBook, 2013.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Paper download
  • Monetary Policy Inclinations, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 43(8), 2011, 1707-1717.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(5), 2009, 831-853.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(2-3), 2009, 507-516
    (Hans Gersbach and Bernhard Pachl)
    Working Paper Version
  • Forward Guidance for Monetary Policy: Is It Desirable?, in "Designing Central Banks", David Mayes, Geoffrey E. Wood (eds.),
    Routledge, 2009.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?, Social Choice and Welfare, 30(4), 2008, 655-683.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39(1), 2007, 133-149.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • Signaling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 10(5), 2006, 595-624.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests and the Appointment of Central Bankers, Economics and Politics, 16(3), 2004, 321-345.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • On the Negative Social Value of Central Banks' Knowledge Transparency, Economics of Governance, 4(2), 2003, 91-102.
    (Hans Gersbach)
    Working Paper Version

Columns / Policy Briefs

Working Papers

Team Members

Cooperation Partner

 
 
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