Foundations of Political Economy

Main content

In this project, we examine the foundations of political competition and social choice. In particular, we are concerned with the following issues:

  • Is public information desirable in social choices?
  • How is political competition affected by two-dimensional informational asymmetries regarding the preferences and competence of candidates?
  • How does non-informative advertising (money burning) impact on political signalling games?
  • How should political campaigns be regulated?


  • Campaigns, Political Mobility and Communication, Public Choice, 161(1), 31–49.
    (Hans Gersbach)
    Working Paper Version
  • Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees, International Journal of Game Theory, 41, 2012, 427–453.
    (Hans Gersbach and Volker Hahn)
    Working Paper Version
  • The Money-Burning Refinement in a Political Signalling Game, International Journal of Game Theory, 33, 2004, 67-87.
    (Hans Gersbach)
    Working Paper Version
  • Size and Distributional Uncertainty, Public Information and the Information Paradox, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 2000, 241-246.
    (Hans Gersbach)
  • Public Information and Social Choice, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 2000, 25-31.
    (Hans Gersbach)

Working Papers

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